The Atomic Energy Act: Some Legal Implications by Editorial Board, Minn. L. Rev.
University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Minnesota Law Review
1952
The Atomic Energy Act: Some Legal Implications
Minn. L. Rev. Editorial Board
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law
Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Editorial Board, Minn. L. Rev., "The Atomic Energy Act: Some Legal Implications" (1952). Minnesota Law Review. 2694.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/2694
Minnesota Law Review
Journal of the State Bar Association
Published monthly, December to June, inclusive, by the Faculty and Stu-
dents of the Law School, University of Minnesota
Subscription Price $5.50 per annum. One dollar per number
LEONARD MI. STRICKLER - ------ Editor-in-Chief
MIONRAD G. PAULSEN - Associate Editor
ROBERT C. 'MCCLU - - - Associate Editor, Book Reviews
STANLEY V. KINYON - ---- - Business Manager
STUDENT
RICHARD E. GRUNERT
RICHARD G. LAREAU
JAMES B. MCKENNEY-
DOROTHY M. OERTING -
JAMES D. SinpsoN -
RAYMOND A. BoGucKi
JOHN P. BYRON
BYRON 2\. CRIPPIN
STANLEY EFRON
THOMAS G. FORS1ERG
JOHN D. GOULD
DAVID L. GRAVEN
JOsEPH E. HAMILTON
JOHN W. HEDBERG
EDITORIAL BOARD
President and Recent Case Editor
- - - - - Note Editor
Associate Editor
Associate Editor
Associate Editor
ROBERT L. HELLAND
JOHN R. HETLAND
THOMAS E. HOLLORAN
LEE N. JOHNSON
RICHARD S. LARsoN
WILLIAM K. MCKIBBAGE
WILLIAM S. ROSEN
WILLIAM A. WHITLOCK
JOHN G. WILLIAMUS
For THE MINNESOTA STATE BAR ASSOCIATION
JOSEPH F. KEPPLE, Secretary Editor
NOTES
THE ATOMIC ENERGY ACT: SOME LEGAL
IMPLICATIONS
The development of atomic energy in the United States" and
the subsequent production of the atomic bomb aroused considerable
concern for the national security. This led to the enactment of the
Atomic Energy Act of 1946.2 The draftsmen of the Act point out
very well its "uniqueness." They say, "It is, in sober fact, an act
without precedent in the legislative history of this or any other
1. For the history of the development of atomic energy in the United
States see Hearings Before Special Committee on Atomic Energy on Sen.
Res. 179, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 553-573 (1946) ; Carbide & Carbon Chemicals
Corp. v. Carson, 239 S. IV. 2d 27, 29 (Tenn. 1951), aff'd, 72 S. Ct. 257
(U.S. 1952).
2. 60 Stat. 755, 42 U. S. C. § 1801 et seq. (1946). Subsequent references
to sections (e.g., 5(a) (1)) are to the Atomic Energy Act.
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country. Never before have men in any state, standing on the
threshold of a new technological era, attempted to provide in ad-
vance for rational control of the forces to be unleashed. And never
before in the peacetime history of the United States has Congress
established an administrative agency vested with such sweeping
authority and entrusted with such portentous responsibilities as
those conferred on the Atomic Energy Commission. The Act creates
a government monopoly of the sources of Atomic Energy and
buttresses this position with a variety of broad governmental powers
and prohibitions on private activity. The field of atomic energy
is made an island of socialism in the midst of a free enterprise
ec6nomy. 3
The Act radically limits traditional rights of private property
and free speech.4 The extent to which these rights are limited is
best understood by enumerating some of the powers granted to the
Atomic Energy Commission. The Act gives the Commission ex-
clusive ownership of all fissionable material, i.e., certain materials
essential to the production of the atomic bomb,5 and the facilitiesO
for the production of fissionable material. The Commission is
further given the power to forbid the possession or transfer as well
an exportation or importation of fissionable material by private indi-
viduals; to prohibit anyone from directly or indirectly engaging in
the production of fissionable material; to determine who may trans-
fer or deliver, receive possession of or title to, or export from the
United States source materials, i.e., the raw materials used in the
production of fissionable material ;7 to control the dissemination of
3. See Newman and Miller, The Control of Atomic Energy 3-4 (1948).
4. It is recognized in the preamble of the Act that the Act may have
considerable effect upon our economic and legal system. It is there stated:
"It is reasonable to anticipate, however, that tapping this new source of energy
will cause profound changes in or" present way of life."
5. The term "Fissionable Material" as defined in & 5(a) (1) of the
Atomic Engery Act "means plutonium, uranium enriched in the isotope 235,
any other material which the Commission determines to be capable of re-
leasing substantial quantities of energy through nuclear chain reaction of
the material, or any material artificially enriched by any of the foregoing;
but does not include source materials," as defined in 5(b) (1).
6. There is an exception: (1) "Facilities which are useful in the con-
duct of research and development in the fields specified in section 3," and
(2) "do not, in the opinion of the Commission, have a potential production
rate adequate to enable the operator of such facilities to produce within a
reasonable period of time a sufficient quantity of fissionable material to produce
an atomic bomb or any other atomic weapon." See 6 4(c) (1).
7. The definition of "source materials" as found in S 5(b)(1) of the
Act is "uranium, thorium, or any other material which is determined by the
Commission, with the approval of the President, to be peculiarly essential
to the production of fissionable materials; but [it] includes ores only if
they contain one or more of the foregoing materials in such concentration
as the Commission may by regulation determine from time to time."
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atomic information; to condemn patents useful in the production of
fissionable material; and to license patents relating to atomic energy
and declare the revocation of a patent useful solely in the production
of fissionable material.
The most extreme departure the Act makes from the present
economic structure of the United States is the creation of a
government monopoly in the field of the production of fissionable
material. The uses of atomic energy are expanding and it may in
the not too distant future affect a considerable portion of the
American economy.8 The reasons given for the creation of a gov-
ernment monopoly in this field are :"
1. The danger from private control of an instrument with such
enormous destructive potentialities.
2. The necessity for safeguarding national health and safety.
3. The anticipation of international agreements.
4. The continuity of operation of the manufacturing process.
5. The assurance of successful development of atomic energy
in its beginning stages.
The reasons seem to justify considerable governmental power.
But whether some of the powers granted are necessary or desirable
is still subject to some doubt. However, it is significant that except
for the control given to the Commission over patents, almost no
opposition to the unprecedented grant of powers was raised in
Congress."0
This Note will not attempt to evaluate the Act as a whole but
will be limited to three aspects of the Act. They are: (1) control
of information relating to atomic energy; (2) evidentiary problems
in the atomic energy field; (3) patent restrictions.
I. CONTROL OF INFORMATION
In adopting the control of information section Congress faced
the difficult problem of providing for both immediate military
security and the necessary freedom of scientific communication for
scientific progress."' Scientific progress is dependent upon the free
exchange of ideas. Every scientist builds on the achievements of
8. See St. John's University, The Implications of Atomic Energy 24-31
(1950).
9. Sen. Rep. No. 1211, 79th Cong. 2d Sess. 14 (1946).
10. For Senate debates see 92 Cong. Rec. 6076-6093 (1946). For House
debates see 92 id. at 9340-9386, 9249-9275, 9463-9477, 9478-9493, 9545-9562(1946).
11. 92 id. at 6096.
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his fellow scientists and predecessors. 12 Hence, too rigid a system
of controls could seriously damage the atomic energy program.
Some scientists believe that complete publication of atomic infor-
mation would be more valuable to us in an armament race than it
would be to any potential enemy.' 3 Most scientists, however, do
not take this extreme position but rather would limit secrecy
regulations only to matters normally kept secret when the manu-
facture of munitions or weapons of war is involved.14 Furthermore,
most scientists believe that they should be allowed to exchange
basic scientific information witih foreign scientists.'2 Congress, how-
ever, decided that such a course would be too dangerous to the
national security, and the recommendations of the so-called atomic
scientists were substantially ignored. It is therefore necessary to
examine the control of information section to see what kind of
balance is created between the apparently divergent interests of
national security and scientific progress.
A. Statement of Policy
It is declared to be the policy of the Atomic Energy Commis-
sion to control the dissemination of restricted data so as to safe-
guard national security.' 6 The Commission is to be guided by two
principles of opposite tendency. They are, as stated in the Act:
"(1) That until Congress declares by joint resolution that ef-
fective and enforceable international safeguards against
the use of atomic energy for destructive purposes have
been established, there shall be no exchange of informa-
tion with other nations with respect to the use of atomic
energy for industrial purposes; and
"(2) That the dissemination of scientific and technical infor-
mation relating to atomic energy should be permitted and
encouraged so as to provide that free interchange of ideas
and criticisms which is essential to scientific progress."17
12. See Hearings before Special Committee on Atomic Energy on Sen.
Res. 179, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 94 (1945) ; Newman and Miller, op. cit. supra
note 3, at 203.
13. See testimony of Dr. Urey at Hearings before Special Committee
on Atomic Energy on Sen. Res. 179, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 88 (1945) ; Newman
has seriously questioned the ability to keep any scientific facts secret. See
Newman and Miller, op. cit. supra note 3, at 211-215. See also testimony of
Louis N. Ridenour, Hearings before Special Committee on Atomic Energy
on Sen. Res. 179, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 536-539 (1946).
14. See resolution by a number of distinguished scientists, 91 Cong.
Rec. A4675 (1945).
15. Ibid. See also Robert Oppenheimer's argument in favor of exchange
of information with foreign scientists. 91 Cong. Rec. 9919 (1945).
16. § 10(a).
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The first principle shows the desire of Congress to protect our
"secrets" in the atomic energy field. This principle is a natural
concomitant of the control given to the Atomic Energy Commis-
sion over information relating to the production of fissionable
material, since the production of fissionable material is an essen-
tial process in the use of atomic energy for industrial purposes.'8
Some misgivings as to the validity of this principle are revealed
by a recent amendment to the Atomic Energy Act approving the
sharing of certain non-weapon atomic data with friendly nations.19
It might be argued that it is undesirable to withhold any atomic
information from friendly nations since the advantage which the
United States will gain from sharing their knowledge in the field
may outweigh the difficulties of maintaining airtight security con-
trol. The second principle clearly recognizes the scientists' need for
the free exchange of ideas. These two principles directly oppose each
other and it is the duty of the Atomic Energy Commission in carry-
ing out the provisions of the control of information section some-
how to reconcile them in order to maintain an effective atomic
energy program.2 0
B. Restricted Data
To accomplish the foregoing task, the Atomic Energy Commis-
sion is given control over the dissemination of certain types of in-
formation relating to atomic energy, which is called "restricted
data." Restricted data includes all data concerning the manufac-
ture of atomic weapons, the production of fissionable material, or
the use of fissionable material in the production of power, but does
not include any data which the Commission determines may be
published without adversely affecting national security.2 '
Data concerning the production of fissionable material and the
use of fissionable material in the production of power together
embrace nearly all information pertaining to atomic energy. Al-
17. §§ 10(a)(1),(2).
IS. See Newman and Miller, op. cit. supra note 3, at 216.
19. See U. S. Cong. Serv. 4454-4457 (1951). The committee felt that
uur defense program would be seriously impaired if we were not able to
take advantage of the improvements made in the atomic energy field by
friendly nationc. e.g., Great Britain's superior atomic reactors. Nevertheless,
these arrangements may not be made too often since it must be unanimously
determined by the Commission that the common defense and security will
be ",ubstantially promoted," not endangered. Furthermore, both the National
Security Council and the President must approve of the plan in writing. It
is also noteworthy that under no circumstances can information pertaining
to atomic weapons be transferred.
20. Sen. Rep. No. 1211, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1946).
21. § 10(b) (1).
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though Congress was interested in leaving "basic science" un-
fettered by secrecy regulations, it was impossible to draw a clear
line of demarcation between basic science and related technical in-
formation.2 2 It would also have been unfeasible to enumerate speci-
fic categories of restricted information because of both the changing.
nature of the types of information to be guarded and the possi-
bility that such publication in itself would reveal information de-
cided to be kept secret. Hence, Congress created an all-inclusive
category of information from which the Atomic Energy Commis-
sion is empowered to withdrawv particular data which in its opinion
is no longer deleterious to national security. Therefore, the task
of reconciling the maintenance of national security with fruitful
research rests entirely upon the Atomic Energy Commission.
This task becomes particularly important if the control of infor-
mation extends to data produced by scientists working in private
laboratories. 23 The necessity then of the Commission publishing up-
to-date and detailed catalogs of declassified information becomes
clear in order that private research may survive.2 4
Final and exclusive authority for removing data from the re-
stricted category rests with the Atomic Energy Commission.23 This
avoids the confusion which would arise if other government agen-
cies would attempt to interpret the restricted data provisions. How-
ever, there is some legal authority to the effect that publication
generally would remove information from the restricted data cate-
gory for the purposes of prosecution under the Act.2 6
C. Criminal Sanctions
Adequate control over the dissemination of restricted data is
enforced by certain criminal sanctions. The types of offenses pun-
ishable under the Act are of -three kinds: (1) Unauthorized trans-
22. 92 Cong. Rec. 6096 (1949).
23. See Newman and Miller, op. cit. supra note 3, at 224.
24. It cannot be said that the Commission has neglected this duty. For
instance, in 1949, 1250 technical papers were released for publication. See
7 Atomic Energy Commission Semi-annual Rep. 171 (1950). It is interesting
to note that a provision in the original Atomic Energy Act authorized the
Commission to maintain information services, libraries and other registers
of information useful to workers in the atomic energy field. This provision
was dropped from the bill in the House on the rather dubious ground that it
would direct the Commission to set up the biggest propaganda agency ever
created by Congress. See 92 Cong. Rec. 9479-9481 (1946).
25. § 10(b)(6).
26. Although there is no reported decision under the penal sections of
the Atomic Energy Act, it has been held that publication of military informa-
tion will preclude punishment for transmission of that information under
the Espionage Act. United States v. Heine, 151 F. 2d 813 (2d Cir. 1945).
[Vol. 36:227
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mittal of restricted data material;'-' (2) Unauthorized acquisition
of restricted data material ;28 (3) Mutilation of certain documents
containing restricted data.2 0 Penalties are imposed if these acts are
committed with the intent to injure the United States or to give
an advantage to a foreign nation. The penalties imposed are par-
ticularly severe for peacetime offenses. If any of the acts are com-
mitted with an intent to injure the United States, and if the jury
so recommends, the offender may be sentenced to death or to life
imprisonment. Without such a recommendation, or if the offender
committed only an offense with an intent to give an advantage to a
foreign nation, the maximum sentence is 20 years. If the un-
authorized transmittal of restricted data is done merely with reason
to believe that such data will be utilized to injure the United States
or give an advantage to a foreign nation, the maximum sentence
is 10 years.
It was first decided that enforcement of secrecy regulations
would be covered by the Espionage Act,30 but it was felt that the
Espionage Act was not adequate to protect our secrets since it
only forbade the unauthorized transfer of secret documents, and
not information as such."' A further limitation of the Espionage
Act is that it extends only to official secrets, while there is some
opinion to the effect that the Atomic Energy Act extends to un-
official secrets2 2 Perhaps another shortcoming of the Espionage
Act is the relatively light penalties prescribed for peacetime of-
fenders. 33
The Espionage Act is not completely superseded by the Atomic
Energy Act in the field of atomic energy. Section 10(b) 6 of the
latter provides that Section 10 shall not exclude the applicable
provisions of any other law except that no government agency shall
take any action under such other laws inconsistent with the pro-
visions of this section. Certain provisions of the Espionage Act
differ from those in the Atomic Energy Act, and hence remain in
27. § 10(b)(2).
28. § 10(b)(3).
29. § 10(b) (4).
30. The Act as first drawn contained no control of information section.
See Hearings before Special Committee on Atomic Energy on Sen. Res. 1717,
79th Cong. 2d Sess. 6 (1946).
31. 92 Cong. Rec. 6096 (1946). But see Newman and Miller, op. cit.
.mtpra, note 3, at 239-241, 371. In some sections of the Espionage Act the
word "information" is used. E.g., 40 Stat. 217-218 (1917), 50 U. S. C. §§
31(a), (e), 32(a) (1946).
32. See Newman and Miller, op. cit. stpra note 3, at 224.
33. The maximum penalty is 20 years. 40 Stat. 217-218 (1917), 50
U. S. C. §§ 31, 32 (1946).
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force in the atomic energy field. For instance, Section 31 (d) of the
Espionage Act3 4 imposes penalties for the mere transfer of secret
documents to persons not entitled to receive them, regardless of
the intent of the offender.
It is thus necessary for the judiciary to perform the difficult
task of determining the exact difference between the two acts. 5
This is undesirable because it makes it very difficult for the nuclear
scientist to know the dangers attendant to particular actions he may
take. It is possible for a loyal scientist to be convicted for an
offense under either act. Furthermore, prosecution will be com-
menced under the Espionage Act without the advice of the Atomic
Energy Commission and thus without the advantage of review by
persons having scientific and technological background. 3
D. Difficulties Faced by the Private Scientist
If the Atomic Energy Act is interpreted to extend to unofficial
information, publication of new discoveries becomes particularly
dangerous for a scientist working in a private laboratory. It is
necessary for him to be fully informed of the scope of restricted
data. This means full knowledge of all regulations and interpreta-
tions issued by the Commission. Even then he will not know with
any degree of certainty whether the information he wants to pub-
lish is restricted data. His only solution is to submit a report to
the Atomic Energy Commission for clearance. If the information
is declared to be secret, he can either refuse to inform any of his
fellow-scientists of the information, or he can inform them and
run the risk that they are either disloyal or are unacquainted with
the control section and regulations issued by the Commission pur-
suant to it. If scientists took the former course, private research
would be intolerably hampered. Yet, if the scientist decided to
transmit the information, he could be imprisoned for ten years for
passing information with reason to believe that the data would be
utilized to injure the United States or give advantage to a foreign
nation, since the term "reason to believe" probably would be con-
strued to mean what a reasonable man would believe under the
circumstances and not what the scientist in fact believed.
Some assurance is given private scientists by the provision of
the Act requiring prosecution to be commenced by the Attorney
34. 40 Stat. 217-218 (1917), 50 U. S. C. § 31(d) (1946).
35. For an excellent analysis of the variations between the two acts
see Newman and Miller, op. cit. upra note 3, at 235-250.
36. § 10(b) (5), discussed in 92 Cong. Rec. 9470-71 (1946).
37. Ibid.
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General only after being advised by the Commission.3 7 Hence the
scientist is comforted by the fact that prosecution will be reviewed
by persons having scientific and technical backgrounds.- s
II. EVIDENTIARY PROBLEMS
The Atomic Energy Act accentuates the difficult problems
which may arise when secret data is necessary to the proper deter-
mination of a civil suit or a criminal prosecution. These problems
may arise in criminal prosecutions for violation of the secrecy
provisions in Section 10, applications for patent awards under Sec-
tion 11, workmen's compensation cases, or tort or contract litigation
involving atomic energy data.3 9
Generally the Government has the common law privilege to
refuse to allow disclosure in court of any information if disclosure
would adversely affect national security40 There are, however, fur-
ther questions which may be faced by the court:
(1) What test will be used to determine whether certain atomic
information is of the kind which if disclosed will adversely
affect national security?
(2) Who is to determine the existence of the privilege in a
given case?
(3) If the atomic information necessary for the proper deter-
mination of a dispute is too important to be disclosed in
open court then what can be done to assure the litigant
of a fair trial?
A. Test Used in Determining What Atomic Information is
Immune from Disclosure
The Atomic Energy Act contains no provision specifically de-
claring what atomic information may or may not be introduced as
evidence in open court. However, the control of information section
provides that the Atomic Energy Commission shall control the
dissemination of restricted data.41 Severe penalties are imposed for
unauthorized transmittal of this type of information. Therefore, it
could easily be inferred that this is the type of information which,
if disclosed, would adversely affect national security, and hence
38. 92 Cong. Rec. 9470 (1946).
39. E.g., Woodvard v. Tennessee Eastman Corp., Civil Docket Nos.
803, 804 (E.D. Tenn. 1948).
40. See 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2378(5) (3d ed. 1940). There is some
question as to whether this privilege can be waived by the Government. See
text to note 69 infra.
41. § 10(a).
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
should be excluded.4 2 But since the term "restricted data" covers
practically all of the important information in the nuclear field, this
test would allow in evidence only an infinitesimal amount of atomic
energy data. However, the definition of restricted data for the
purposes of admissibility in court may and should vary according
to the relative importance of the particular data in question and
the need for the evidence in the dispute.
Another suggestion 43 is that restricted data should be excluded
only if it is injurious to the United States or advantageous to a
foreign nation. This is an adaptation of the elements necessary to
convict a person of unauthorized communication of restricted data.
This test has the apparent advantage of avoiding a possible con-
flict between the Atomic Energy Commission and the court over
the definition of restricted data since the court could recognize
that the Commission considers the information restricted and still
admit the evidence. Furthermore, on its face, the test would seem
to be more liberal in the admissibility of atomic energy data. How-
ever, realistically, there is p:robably little difference between the
two tests. A judge lacking in technical knowledge of the atomic
energy field is likely to rely heavily upon the fact that certain data
is restricted in determining whether its disclosure will be in-
jurious to the United States or advantageous to a foreign nation.
Moreover, the Government will probably only have to show that
there is a reasonable basis for believing that the data is within the
excluded category.
Another possible view is that only restricted data which is in-
jurious to the United States should be excluded. This view, how-
ever, is not in line with the policy of the control of information sec-
tion and furthermore may be too liberal in allowing admissibility.
The question of the test to be used in determining admissibility
of atomic energy data is impcrtant only if the court is to decide the
question. The next problem is to ascertain the court's role in deter-
mining admissibility.
B. Who Determines the Privilege?
The principle that information essential to the national security
will not be disclosed in open court is referred to as a "topical
42. This conclusion is further supported by the declassification powers of
the Atomic Energy Commission. The Commission may remove information
from the category of restricted data if in its opinion the data can be pub-
lished without adversely affecting the common defense and security. § 10
(b) (1).
43. See Haydock, Some Evidentiary Problems Posed by Atomic Energy
Security Requirements, 61 Harv. L. Rev. 468, 470 (1948).
[Vol. 36:227
NOTES
privilege for facts constituting secrets of state."44 Wigmore states
that by analogy with other privileges the courts should make the
final determination of whether official information should be dis-
closed." However, unlike other privileges, this is not a privilege
for the protection of the individual interests of the persons involved
in the litigation, which interests the courts have traditionally
guarded, but its purpose is to safeguard the interests of the State.46
The governmental privilege of non-disclosure must also be dis-
tinguished from the doctrine of sovereign immunity, which would
preclude any type of discovery procedure against the Government.4 7
However, this doctrine, which has rarely been advocated by the
Government,"8 is rendered ineffectual by the Federal Rules since
its devices for compelling disclosure do not exempt the United
States.4"
There is little authority in the United States to support Wig-
more's position that the judge determines the existence of the
privilege. However, in United States v. Burr,50 where the court
was faced with the question whether the President could be re-
quired to produce any paper in his possession, Chief Justice Mar-
shall indicated that the advisability of refraining from disclosing
official information is a question for the court.5 '
44. See S Wigmore, Evidence 734 (3d ed. 1940).
45. Id. at 799.
46. This privilege may be exercised irrespective of whether the gov-
ernment is a party to the litigation or even a witness. Firth Sterling Steel
Co. v. Bethlemem Steel Co., 199 Fed. 353 (E.D. Pa. 1912). Also the court
may upon its own motion refuse to allow the introduction of state secrets
in evidence. Totten v. United States, 92 U. S. 105 (1875) (by implication).
Furthermore, the court may reverse on appeal the erroneous admission of
such evidence even though reversal is not urged by the holder of the privilge.
Ibid.
47. The theory is that the devices used in the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure for compelling disclosure have the effect of making the Gov-
ernment a defendant in a suit for discovery and, therefore, may not be used
against the Government without its consent. See O'Reilly, Discovery Against
the United States: A New Aspect of Sovereign Immunity? 21 N. C. L. Rev.
1 (1942).
48. This doctrine was urged in United States v. General Motors Corpo-
ration, 2 F.R.D. 528 (N.D. Ill. 1942) and was rejected by the court.
49. Reynolds v. United States, 192 F. 2d 987 (3d Cir. 1951) ; United
States v. General Motors Corp., 2 F. R. D. 528 (N.D. Ill. 1942)
50. 25 Fed. Gas. 187, No. 14,694 (C.C.D. Va. 1807).
51. "The president, although subject to the general rules which apply
to others, may have sufficient motives for declining to produce a particular
paper, and those motives may be such as to restrain a court from enforcing
production." Id. at 191. "Perhaps the court ought to consider the reasons
which would induce the president to refuse to exhibit such a letter as con-
clusive on it, unless such letter could be shown to be absolutely necessary in
the defense. The president may himself state the particular reasons which
may have induced him to withhold a paper, and the court would unquestionably
allow their full force to those reasons. At the same time the court could
not refuse to pay proper attention, to the affidavit of the accused." Id. at 192.
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Vith respect to documents in the possession of the executive
agencies, the existing practice has been for the executive depart-
ment to determine whether or not the document should be dis-
closed. This is in accordance with the issuance of regulationsO- by
the various department heads prohibiting their subordinates from
complying with orders of the court to produce government docu-
ments, unless otherwise directed by the agency head. These regu-
lations are issued pursuant to a federal statute 3 authorizing each
department to prescribe regulations "not inconsistent with law"
for the custody, use and preservation of records, papers and prop-
erty. The regulations have been held to be within the scope of the
statutory authority in Boske v. Comnzingore5 even though the
broad language and history of the statute seem to reveal that it
was not intended to create a new privilege from disclosure.55 Hence,
if the regulations were not "inconsistent with law" the Court ap-
parently assumed that the law prior to the adoption of the regula-
tions was that the executive determines whether or not documents
in his possession should be disclosed. The Boske case was reaffirmed
in a recent United States Supreme Court decision involving a
Justice Department regulation of this type."
The emphasis upon civilian control in the Atomic Energy Act
seems to negative the possibility of the military department deter-
mining the existence of the privilege,5 7 and it might be contended
that the cases upholding executive determination of the privilege
are no authority for the determination by an administrative agency
created by an act of Congress. But it seems that determinative
powers of the Atomic Energy Commission with respect to dis-
closure might be inferred from the control of information section,
which provides that it shall be the policy of the Atomic Energy
Commission to control the dissemination of restricted data in such
52. For example, a Justice Department regulation provides that when-
ever a subpoena duces tecum is served to produce official information the
officer of employee on whom such subpoena is served will refuse to obey it
unless otherwise directed by the Attorney General. 11 Fed. Reg. 177A-107,
(E) § 51.71 (1946).
53. 5 U.S.C. § 22 (1946).
54. 177 U.S. 459, 469 (1900).
55. The purpose of the statute apparently was to furnish each depart-
ment with authority to regulate the conduct of its officers and employees and
administration of the office. See Butler v. White, 83 Fed. 578, 581 (C.C.D.
Mr. Va. 1897), rev'd on other grounds, 171 U.S. 379 (1898).
56. United States v. Ragen, 340 U.S. 462 (1951), 35 Minn. L. Rev. 586.
57. Final and exclusive authority for removing information from the
restricted category rests with the Atomic Energy Commission. § 10(b) (6).
For an excellent discussion of the military V. civilian control problem see
Miller, A Law is Passed-The Atomic Energy Act of 1946 15 U. of Chi.
L. Rev. 799 (1948).
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a manner as to secure the common defense and security.58 This
conclusion is further supported by the powers given the Commis-
sion to declassify restricted data which will not adversely affect
national security.59
Some of the reasons against judicial determination of the privi-
lege are stated in an English case60 which ruled that an administra-
tive determination with respect to disclosure is conclusive. The
first reason is that since a judicial inquiry cannot take place in
private, a public inquiry may do all the mischief which it is sup-
posed to guard against.6 ' Why a judicial inquiry in this instance
must take place in public is a question not answered by the court.
Certainly a private judicial inquiry would not injure a defendant
to a greater extent than an administrative inquiry which is not
only private but is a case of an agency determining its own cause.
A second reason stated is that where the State is a party to the
proceedings it would be unfair for the judge to communicate with
one party to the exclusion of the other. But an ex parte proceeding
is certainly better than no proceeding at all. The most valid reason
given is that an administrative official is best able to determine
whether disclosure of certain documents would be prejudicial to
the public interest. This would be particularly true in the highly
technical field of atomic energy.
An argument against administrative determination is that the
administrator would tend to look only to the security aspect of
the problem and not take into consideration the interests of the
litigants. Furthermore, since the field of atomic energy is expand-
ing, many of these determinations may be handled by subordinates
of the Atomic Energy Commission, who in determining their own
cause may tend to be overcautious in releasing government docu-
ments. Wigmore cites examples of the perfunctory manner in
which requests for permission to examine official information pro-
tected by other privileges are handled.6 2
If it is decided that Atomic Energy Commission determination
is necessary there is a further problem of devising some sort of
check upon its decisions. One writer has'suggested that the court
be empowered to compel the Commission to submit a sealed state-
ment setting out in general terms the reason for its determination. 63
58. § 10(a).
59. § 10(b) (1).
60. Duncan v. Cammell, Laird & Co., [1942] A.C. 624.
61. Id. at 639.
62. See 8 Wigrnore, Evidence 793-796 (3d ed. 1940).
63. See Haydock, mipra note 43, at 477.
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The court may consider it, and if on its face it has no clear founda-
tion, the court may reject the claim of privilege. This, however,
does not meet the objection that subordinates might in fact deter-
mine the privilege. Another suggestion is the creation of a special
court to review the Atomic Energy Commission's claims of privi-
lege.6 4 Plaintiff would obtain a Commission ruling and then appeal
to this court before the trial began. Many of the objections to
administrative determination would then be met. Nevertheless,
there are difficulties in showing an absolute need for the court.
C. Excluded Information and a Fair Trial
Exclusion of Atomic Energy data may impose severe hard-
ships on a private litigant or a defendant in a criminal prosecution.
Thus, in Woodward v. Tennessee Eastman Corporation, a plain-
tiff sued for damages, alleging that she had contracted an occupa-
tional disease at Oak Ridge. In order to substantiate her case, it
was necessary for her to prove certain facts about a uranium com-
pound. These facts were excluded as being secrets of state, and
the case was dismissed. The litigant in a civil suit or a defendant in
a criminal case may also be handicapped when he attempts to
cross-examine a particular witness with respect to certain infor-
mation relating to atomic energy. The witness can refuse to answer
and effective cross-examination is thwarted. This obstacle might
frequently arise in applications for patent awards where the Gov-
ernment denies that an invention is useful in the production of
fissionable material. If a witness for the Government testifies that
the invention is not so used, how would the applicant cross-examine
him without touching upon privileged information?
The problem is more serious in criminal prosecutions, both for
the prosecution and for the defendant. In a prosecution under Sec-
tion 10 of the Act, the question of whether or not the document is
secret is probably for the jury to decide.6 If that is the issue in
the dispute, the Government faces the dilemma of either proceed-
ing with the prosecution and thus revealing the secret data, or re-
64. Ibid.
65. Civil Docket Nos.'803, 804 (E.D. Tenn. 1948). Also a group of
suits were brought in federal district court in New Jersey by certain persons
alleging damage to their peach crops because of the activities of a nearby
plant working on atomic energy material. The judge excused the defendants
from answering certain of the plaintiff's interrogatories. The case was settled
in 1949. See Boskey, Inventions and the Atom, 50 Col. L. Rev. 432, 444 n. 27
(1950).
66. The question whether certain documents relate to the national de-
fense for the purposes of prosecution under the Espionage Act has recently
been held to be a question of fact for the jury. Gorin v. United States, 312
U.S. 19 (1941).
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fusing to introduce the documents in evidence and possibly receiv-
ing a dismissal of the case.
Also, the defendant in a criminal prosecution might be de-
prived of evidence which might aid him in his defense.67 However,
in cases involving related privileges of non-disclosure, there has
developed a theory analogous to waiver, that where the secret docu-
ments directly touch the criminal proceedings, prosecution neces-
sarily ends any confidential character that the documents may
possess."" This ig an unsatisfactory manner of solving the problem,
since it completely ignores the Government's interest in adequate
law enforcement. It is questionable whether the theory will be ap-
plied to privileges of non-disclosure which relate to military secrets.
Because of the difficulties facing parties to a criminal prosecu-
tion or other litigants when secret data is involved, it becomes
necessary to devise certain judicial methods which will secure a
fair trial. Determination by the court of the materiality of the
documents can, in some instances, reduce the scope of the prob-
lem, but where the documents are relevant to the issues in the case
new devices are needed.
Assuming the documents are material the most frequently sug-
gested solution is a secret hearing with, of course, security checks
of the persons involved in the litigation. This type of proceeding
was used in England during World W'Var II to prevent disclosure
of secret data in court"" and was similarly allowed for such pur-
poses in the admiralty cases of the United States during the war.70
Moreover, in camera proceedings have been allowed for varying
types of judicial and administrative actions for seemingly less
compelling reasons than that of providing for a fair trial.71
Secret hearings may differ from normal judicial proceedings in
various ways. The litigant may be deprived of a lawyer of his own
choosing because he failed to hurdle the security clearance, or of
certain witnesses for the same reason. Presumably, if the lower
67. See United States v. Ebeling, 146 F. 2d 254 (2d Cir. 1944).
68. United States v. Andolschek, 142 F. 2d 503 (2d Cir. 1944) ; United
States v. Beekman, 155 F. 2d 580 (2d Cir. 1946) ; United States v. Krule-
witch, 145 F. 2d 76 (2d Cir. 1944).
69. The Emergency Powers (Defence) Act, 1939, 2 & 3 Geo. 6, c. 62§6.
70. 316 U. S. 717 (1942), amending Admiralty Rule 46. This provision
has now been suspended, 328 U. S. 882 (1946).
71. For situations where secret hearings are held before administrative
agencies see Rep. Att'y Gen. Comm. Ad. Proc. 68 (1941). For judicial pro-
ceedings see Romero v. Squier. 133 F. 2d 528 (9th Cir.), cert. dended. 318
U. S. 785 (1943) (court-martial) ; State v. Smythe, 25 Wash. 2d 161, 169 P.
2d 706 (1946) (juvenile cases).
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court decision is appealed, the record will have to be sealed when
sent up to the appellate court. Moreover, the Atomic Energy Com-
mission will most likely determine what data will appear in the
record or it would be impossible for the Commission adequately
to perform its statutory function of controlling the dissemination
of restricted data.
Some constitutional difficulties may arise where federal crimi-
nal prosecutions are involved. The Sixth Amendment to the United
States Constitution guarantees the defendant a public trial. But in
cases involving salacious facts it has been held that the court may
exclude the public if the defendant is not prejudiced by the action.7 2
Seemingly more justification for an in camera proceeding existsi
in the restricted data cases. However, recently the United States
Supreme Court has strongly disapproved of in camera proceedings
in criminal cases.73
Further problems arise when, in a federal prosecution, the
right to a jury trial is invoked. Not only does the security prob-
lem become more difficult because of the increased number of per-
sons who will be exposed to the restricted, data, but the necessary
security clearances of the jurors may give rise to a possible con-
stitutional objection to special. juries. This latter problem may not
be too serious, however, since it has been held that special juries
do not violate the due process or equal protection clause if there
is a reasonable basis for elimination from the panel.7 4
In some instances, however, information might be too impor-
tant to disclose to the limited number of persons present at a secret
hearing. Perhaps a secret hearing should be allowed only with per-
mission of the court. The court might refuse permission if the
Government gives sufficient reasons why disclosure of the informa-
tion at a secret hearing would endanger national security. If secret
hearings are rejected for constitutional reasons there is the ex-
pedient of providing loyalty checks on the spectators at the trial.
However, the danger of unauthorized disclosure would seem too
great.
There are other possible devices than a secret hearing that
72. Reagan v. United States. 202 Fed. 488 (9th Cir. 1913). But cf.
Tanksley v. United States, 145 F. 2d 58 (9th Cir. 1944).
73. See In Re Oliver, 333 U. S. 257, 266 (1948), 33 Minn. L. Rev. 71.
where the Court stated: "we have been unable to find a single instance of a
criminal trial conducted in camera in any federal, state, or municipal court
during the history of this country." See also id. at 271. However, the case
itself was one where the particular exclusion was nrejudicial.
74. Fay v. New York, 332 U. S. 261 (1947), 32 Minn. L. Rev. 297
(1948).
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might provide a solution to the problem. A device suggested by
the Atomic Energy Committee would be particularly helpful to
the Government. The Committee proposed a statute compelling
all persons working with restricted data to sign a stipulation that
the documents used in their work are materials which would be
detrimental to the United States if delivered to an unauthorized
person.7 This would allow the Government to avoid presenting
to the jury the question whether the documents are restricted data
for the purposes of prosecution under Section 10. However, a
serious issue of enforced waiver of the right to a jury trial would
most likely be raised.76
Another method, which the Government resorted to in United
States v. Haugen,77 is the use of secondary evidence. In that case,
the Government found it necessary to prove an agency relation-
ship between the Government and a private corporation. Whether
that agency in fact existed depended upon the construction of a
contract which was secret by orders of the War Department. A
Government witness who had seen a copy of the contract testified
as to the existence of the agency relationship. The court held the
testimony to be inadmissible because the witness had seen only a
copy of the contract, but the court further stated that the fact that
the document is secret data is the same as if it were unaccountable
and therefore not violative of the "best evidence rule."
Another device is opinion evidence. The Government could have
an expert testify as to whether the stolen documents are within
the category of restricted data. However, the difficulty with both
opinion and secondary evidence as a useful technique is that the
defendant will not be able adequately to cross-examine the witness,
since the witness could refuse to answer, relying upon the Govern-
mental privilege from disclosure. One writer has suggested the use
of a court-appointed expert.78 Although cross-examination would
still be somewhat circumscribed at least perhaps objective testi-
mony would be secured.
III. PATENTS
The patent section of the Atomic Energy Act presents a con-
siderable modification of traditional patent policy. It completely
abolishes patent rights in certain fields of patentable inventions,
and in other fields sets up a compulsory licensing system. The sec-
75. See N. Y. Times, July 23, 1947, p. 11, col. 1.
76. Cf. Insurance Company v. Morse, 20 Wall. 445, 451 (U.S. 1874).
77. 58 F. Supp. 436 (E.D. Wash. 1944).
78 See Haydock, supra note 43, at 488.
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tion provoked criticism from the Patent Bar 79 and considerable op-
position in Congress8" because of the fear that it would considerably
weaken investment and invention incentive in the atomic field. It
is the purpose of this portion of the Note to determine the extent
to which the American patent system is modified by the Act, and
to evaluate the justification for the modifications.
A. Abrogation of Patent Rights in Fields of Production
and Military Utilization
The Act prohibits the patenting of any invention which is use-
ful solely in the production of fissionable material, or in the utiliza-
tion of fissionable material or atomic energy for a military weapon.
Patents of this description already granted are revoked and com-
pensation is provided. 8
1
This provision is a necessary consequence of other sections of
the Act prohibiting industrial activity by private business in these
fields.8 2 A patent is merely a right to prevent others from using
the patented invention. The creation of a government monopoly
prevents the operation of this right to exclude since all but the
Commission and its licensees are prohibited from using the patent-
ed invention, including even the patentee. Hence, the granting of
patent rights would be a useless and confusing process.
It has been argued that a licensing system rather than govern-
ment monopoly would have been sufficient to prevent the dangers
attendant to private ownership.8 3 A licensing system with adequate
inspection arrangements would seem to answer the contention that
private manufacture of materials of such enormous destructive po-
tentialities necessitates government monopoly. However, it seems
inadequate to protect either the necessary secrecy or the continuity
of operation of the plants.
Another argument in favor of government monopoly is that
private development would be undesirable in any area which may
soon be placed under government control by reason of inter-
national agreements. However, the uncertainty of possible interna-
tional control of atomic energy makes this argument somewhat
hypothetical.
A further justification for the patent section is that the aboli-
79. 92 Cong. Rec. 9488 (1946).
80. 92 id. at 9483-9493.81. § Ill(a) (1).
82. §§ 4, 5.
83. See text to notes 9 and 10 supra; Valimont, Atomic Eneriqy Patent
Provisions and the American Economy, 31 J. Pat. Off. Soc'y 743, 746 (1949).
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tion of patents will prevent disclosure of restricted data. The validity
of this contention is considerably strengthened by the fact that
one of the purposes of the patent system is full and complete dis-
closure of the device to be patented. Immediately prior to the
adoption of the Atomic Energy Act, national security in this area
was protected only by an amendment to the patent law allowing a
three-year delay in the issuance of patents upon inventions im-
ijortant to the armament or defense of the United States. 4 How-
ever, this applied only to Government-owned inventions and there-
fore additional protection was necessary. Opponents of the patent
section of the Atomic Energy Act suggested further amendments
to the Patent Act as a solution, continuing much of the control
the Commissioner of Patents previously had over patents. s 5 It
would seem, however, that the Atomic Energy Commission is more
competent to decide the advisability of publishing atomic informa-
tion than the Commissioner of Patents. Furthermore, the difficul-
ties over the litigation of "secret patents" and the nuisance of
defensive patenting by the Government"6 would not be avoided
as they are by the abolition of patent rights.
A further provision in the Act within the field of production
and military utilization abolishes patent rights to the extent that
the invention is used in the production of fissionable material or
in the utilization of fissionable material or atomic energy for a
military weapon.'s This provision raises many serious problems.
The determination of the extent to which an invention is used in the
production of fissionable material is extremely difficult. A myriad
of devices could e classified as those used in the production of
fissionable material, though they have no relation to the purpose
of the Act (e.g., a stepladder). Perhaps some alleviation from this
difficulty might be provided by construing "used" to include only
those devices essentially useful in the production of fissionable
material. A further question to be answered is whether "used"
means devices actually used or those which could be used.
Then too, it becomes extremely difficult to maintain effective
security restrictions when devices highly useful in the production
84. 39 Stat. 348 (1916), as amended, 35 U. S. C. § 37 (1946). In times
of war the Patent Office is allowed to prevent publication of patents relating
to military devices. 40 Stat. 394 (1917), as amended, 54 Stat. 710 (1940), 35
U. S. C. § 42 (1946).
85. See Hafner, Atomic Energy and Patent Law, 33 J. Pat. Off. Soc'y
35, 56 (1951).86. Hearings before Special Committee on Atomic Energy on S. 1717,
79th Cong., 2d Sess. 337-358 (1946).
87. § lI(a)(2).
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of fissionable material can be patented for other purposes. MIuch
of what is supposedly secret will most likely be disclosed. Another
shortcoming of this provision arises when an inventor is unaware
of uses of his invention not within this section. He applies for a
patent and it is rejected by the Patent Office. He then obtains the
statutory award from the Atomic Energy Commission and the
Commission uses the invention for more than a year. Meanwhile
important uses in the unprohibited field are discovered. However,
the use of the invention for a year by the Atomic Energy Com-
mission has deprived him of any right to patent the invention for
unprohibited uses.83 The Act does not provide for compensation
adjustments in this situation.
B. Abolition of Patent Rights Upon Inventions
Useful in Research
Section 11(b) provides that "no patent hereafter granted shall
confer any rights with respect to any invention or discovery to the
extent that such invention or discovery is used in the conduct of
research or development activities in the fields specified in sec-
tion 3." The purpose of this provision is to remove the burden of
patent restrictions or abuses from private research. In particular,
it permits inventors to construct their own devices in the conduct
of research without fear of infringement and prevents invention
suppression. 89
Certain difficulties arise over the interpretation of the word
"use." Does it mean only that one may conduct research free from
patent restrictions, or does the term include the manufacture and
the sale of the invention? The broader interpretation seems to be
more in accord with the purpose of the section since otherwise
purchases of the devices from non-patented manufacturers could
give rise to the same difficulties which the Act attempted to remove.
Unlike other provisions of the Act which abolish patent rights,
the research section does not grant compensation for inventions
made after the adoption of the Act. This seems to substantiate the
theory that Congress was attempting to give statutory recognition
to a principle of questionable authority in patent law that experi-
mental use does not constitute infringement.90 This seems to be
88. 53 Stat 1212 (1939). 35 U. S. C. § 31 (1946).
89. See Newman and M[iller, op. At. supra note 3, at 152.
90. This principle apparently emanates from a statement .made by
Justice Story in Wittemore v. Cutter, 29 Fed. Cas. No. 17600, at 1121
(C.C.D. Mass. 1813). See also Dugan v. Lear Avia, Inc., 55 F. Supp. 223,
229 (S.D. N.Y. 1944). But see Albright v. Celluloid Harness-Trimming Co.,
1 Fed. Cas. No. 147, at 323 (C.C.D. N.J. 1877).
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undesirable in that it removes the last vestige of incentive an in-
ventor or investor might have in developing important research
apparatus."1
C. Compulsory Licensing
In fields of non-military utilization of inventions, a compulsory
licensing system is present. Whenever a patent is declared to be
affected with public interest, the Atomic Energy Commission and
any person or corporation licensed by the Commission under Sec-
tion 7 of the Act to manufacture, produce or export equipment
utilizing fissionable material or atomic energy are automatically
licensed to use the invention covered by such patent.92 It is the
duty of the Commission to declare a patent "affected with the
public interest" if (A) the invention utilizes or is essential to the
utilization of fissionable material or atomic energy, and (B) the
licensing is necessary to effectuate the policies and purposes of the
Act."' The Act further provides that the owner of the patent shall
be entitled to a reasonable royalty for the use of the invention,
either as determined by agreement between himself and the licensee,
or by determination of the Commission.9 4
The scope of compulsory licensing is somewhat limited since it
only extends to the Commission and its licensees, and only to those
devices covered by Section 7. However, within this area it aids in
the effectuation of the policy in Section 7(c) of issuing on a non-
exclusive basis licenses to utilize fissionable material.
The enormously destructive potentialities of atomic energy seem
to necessitate Commission supervision, at least, for the purposes
of national security or public health and safety. However, control
is given over operations which have merely economic implications.
An argument in favor of this extension is that unrestricted patent-
ing may lead to a limiting of competition in this very important
field, and thus possibly lessen the availability of non-military uses
to the American public.95 Yet, under compulsory licensing, the
industry with the more efficient research and development pro-
gram is not rewarded. If the inventor is unsuccessful on a particu-
lar invention, he pays the loss. If he is successful, he must still
91. It might be argued that the inventor's right to an invention is "prop-
erty" and therefore that he can recover compensation under § 13 (a). Valimont,
supra note 76, at 753.
92. ll(c) (2).
93. § 11(c)(1).
94. § II(c)(2).
95. For an excellent discussion of the ways in which the Patent Law
has led to serious economic evils see Stocking and Watkins, Menopoly and
Free Enterprise 447-490 (1951).
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share the invention with others according to royalty fees set by the
Commission.
The Commission, recognizing the possible ill effects of com-
pulsory licensing, has declared that it will not use it except "under
certain rather exceptional circumstances." ' Also the Commission
has instituted a policy of allowing the inventor or investor exten-
sive rights as to the non-military uses which might arise out of
the invention.97 Adherence to these policies would lessen con-
siderably the danger that inventor or investment incentive will be
destroyed, and at the same time would provide a safeguard against
extreme economic abuses.
A notable omission in the compulsory licensing provision is
devices for medical therapy. This is due to the fact that they were
excluded under Section 7 to avoid interference with research. The
same reasons however do not apply to Section 11. We now have
the strange result of allowing patent abuses in the very important
fields of medicine but not in the industrial fields. There is no reason
for the distinction and it should be corrected.
D. Purchase or Condemnation of Inventions and Patents
Under Section 11 (d) the Atomic Energy Commission is given
the power to purchase or condemn patents useful in the production
of fissionable material or atomic energy. Seemingly, the only value
of this provision is to prevent issuance of certain types of patents
of inventions not useful solely in the production of fissionable ma-
terial when issuance would endanger national security. Why there
is any other need for acquiring patents already under control by
virtue of the licensing provision is not apparent.
E. Administration of the Patent Section
1. Reporting Procedures
Any person who makes an invention which is useful in the pro-
duction of fissionable material or atomic energy for a military
weapon is required to file with the Commission a report containing
a complete description of the invention, unless the invention is
described in an application for a patent filed in the Patent Office
by that person within the time required for the filing of the report9 s
The time for reporting is the sixtieth day after :9
A. The date of enactment of the Act;
96. 5 Atomic Energy Commission Semi-annual Rep. 148 (1949).
97. Atomic Energy Commission, Patent Advisory Panel Rep. 18 et. seq.
(1947).
98. § 11(a) (3).
99. Ibid.
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B. The completion of the invention;
C. The date he has reason to believe that the invention is
useful in the production of fissionable material.
The penalty for failure to report is the loss of compensation for
the invention.100
So many ambiguities are present in this section that it would
seem almost impossible for an inventor to know if and when he
should report a given invention. First there is the difficulty of de-
termining what kind of inventions he must report. The number of
inventions useful in the production of fissionable material are almost
limitless, including even the most insignificant of items (e.g.,
gloves).
Secondly, assuming he has an invention clearly within the pro-
hibited field, it is difficult to know when he must report it. When
is an invention completed, when the idea is conceived or when the
invention is ready for use? Also the determination of when a person
has reason to believe an invention will be used in the production
of fissionable material may prove extremely difficult.
It would seem advisable for an inventor faced with these obstacles
to adopt the alternative reporting procedure of merely filing an
application for a patent with the Patent Office.' 0' This would at
least relieve him of the burden of determining what kind of in-
vention he must report. It would also decrease the number of insig-
nificant reports which the Atomic Energy Commission might other-
wise have to handle.
2. Compensation
In determining compensation for abrogated patent rights as
well as royalty fees for compulsory licenses the Atomic Energy
Commission must take into consideration certain factors102:
1. "The extent to which the patent was developed through fed-
erally financed research";
2. "Degree of utility, novelty and importance of the invention";
3. The actual use of the invention.
The Commission may also take into account the cost to the
owner of developing the invention or acquiring the patent.
The determination of royalty fees for the patents of inventions
subjected to compulsory licensing will not prove too difficult, be-
cause by the time the invention is disclosed to be "affected with
100. § 11(e) (2) (C).
101. § 11(a) (3).
102. § 11 (e) (3) (A).
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public interest", the value will probably be easily determinable.
This is not true of awards for patents automatically abrogated under
Section 11 (a). The determination of awards for these patents will
depend considerably upon future developments of the invention,
which developments may be very difficult to predict. To avoid any
speculation as to the worth of the invention, it is perhaps desirable
to provide for subsequent compensation adjustments in accordance
with the utilization or development of the inventions.
